Mukhtar, Z., Rasheed, A. and Jamil, M. N. (2023). Ownership Structure's Impact on Corporate Social Performance in Dissimilar Industry Groups: Evidence from Pakistan. *Bulletin of Business and Economics*,12(2), 320-331. https://doi.org/10.61506/01.00005

Bulletin of Business and Economics
ISSN - 2409 - 9368

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE'S IMPACT ON CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE IN DISSIMILAR INDUSTRY GROUPS: EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the mixed relations among ownership structure and corporate social responsibility in different non-financial industries across Pakistan. The OLS regression models are estimate using the data from 2011 to 2020 of Pakistani non-financial industries. Ownership structure including managerial ownership (MOWN) concentration ownership (COWN) and family ownership (FOWN) encourages corporate social responsibility (CSR) of organizations with social and environmental market capitalization risk coverage. Generally, the positive outcome of ownership structure is established in different non-financial industries at a combined level whereas investigates the firms with a whole market capitalization risk exposure. The detecting suggest that ownership structure can mitigate the market capitalization risk coverage non-financial industries in terms of relationship improving the CSR and the benefit can emerged with the addition of equal female director in family ownership firms (executive or independent) to the panel. This study also call attention to the ownership structure improves CSP in different non-financial industries with market capitalization risk coverage while performance so in industries with control risk coverage after accompaniment by independent director effects and critical mass effects.

KEYWORDS: Corporate social performance, ownership structure, managerial ownership, agency theory, director independence

1. INTRODUCTION

Corporate social performance (CSP) firms demand to involve in contributing to development in the society and environment. The corporate social performance (CSP) is apprehensive of firms to customers, societies, and environment whereas producing profits and satisfying the requirements of owners and employees to keeping the responsibility. The combination of CSR performs into firm's decision making and business activity leads to attractiveness, provides commercial opportunity in new markets, and finally helps to confirm firm's sustainability (Hunjra et al., 2020).

The corporate social responsibility (CSR) idea has established an important volume of awareness worldwide business and impact on environment and society over decades. The importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) also being concerned to require a firms whose field of business is in linked to the field of natural resources to carry out environment and social responsibility. The CSR is responsibility that must be implemented by every firm and the states that every investor is appreciative to implement corporate social responsibility (Rahmawaty & Maswan, 2020)

The corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance (CFP) relationship with growth and performance of industry grow or positive outcomes with explanatory power of industry-level has been growing and improve market strategies of corporate social performance (Brower & Dacin, 2020) the industry shows that growth or higher leverage, risk, capital intensity and the competitive challenge with other industries and firms, the association of CSRP for performance include financial, reputation, productivity, and innovation performance in growth of industry and corporate social performance significant contribution to industry growth.(Uyar et al., 2020)

The board diversity examining the relationship with corporate social responsibility (CSR) and performance in growth of industry and development of opportunity and diversity of "board of directors (BD)," or gender diversity the examines age and education of female board members and the relationship between board gender diversity and CSR performance and stakeholder groups of organizations and industries are interested in financial performance but environment social make decisions about related organization and industry such as investing into company product and services. The environmental performance in firms necessary to understand "management and organization (MO)" studies is diversity management (Colakoglu et al., 2020) the Corporate Governance and performance structure as the standard set of rules for the company's and industry's structure to be implemented in the company's and organizations practice. And the main objective of this paper board size of industry's and firms better explaining such as board size (BS) with corporative social responsibility and moderator such as industry 's growth and development (Khan et al., 2021; Sulehri et al., 2022).

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The Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and activities can lead the way of economic benefits to the firms and industry's growth and returns for long term or the CSR has been represented and covering the issues of growth increasingly in importance for business performance at global level and grow industries. However, the objectives of CSR should go with to State ownership enterprises or consideration of financial indicators industries and firms. The SOEs in the perspective of an emerging economy and the state-owned enterprises static significant role plays in corporate social performance and corporate social responsibility or developed performance in business sectors industries and organizations(Masoud & Vij, 2021) the CSR performs a dominant role in company policies and strategies due to their effect on characters of firms such as reputation, and next on firms' performance the CSR measures importance and essentials to succeeded in relations with stakeholders tend to grow those companies show a reliable attitude to environmental and social dimensions and long-term strategies of corporate social performance.(Crisan-Mitra et al., 2020; Nyudzor, 2023). The Corporate social responsibility (CSR) have a positive significant impact on organizational environment and success (Jamil & Rasheed, 2023; Jamil et al.,, 2022). Employees diversity impact on employees behavior and organization success (Mukhtar et al., 2022; Chineze, 2023; Namadi, 2023).

corporate social responsibility as internal and external with in organization and internal responsibility as directed to shareholders and workers to recognized to profitability and company growth, external responsibility correlated to regulations and role of firms and organization in terms of tax payments and provided that employment works(Adiputra, Wijaya, & Affandi, 2020) the firms and organizations involved in environment, social and governance (ESG) addition in objects in different ways and organizations corporate social responsibility (CSR) promote or activities or distribute the formal reports of CSR activities accomplishments (Ting, Azizan, Bhaskaran, & Sukumaran, 2020; Bilal & Tanveer, 2023' Idris, 2023) the moderating outcomes of industries with CSP and CSR relationship between corporative productivity the reason for selecting, Pakistani industry as research sample with competitive industries and the profitability of companies CSR measures the impact on comparable listed companies(Wu et al., 2021) Quality management, CSR and organization success (Yang et al., 2023; Salleh & Sapengin, 2023).

The organization monitoring and controlling managers interests of shareholders and board of directors(BOD) the controlling and monitoring organizations strategic plans to achieving management objective goals of organizations(Saleh et al., 2021) the performance of CSR for long term of improvement of firms increasing the macro economy provide important benefits to better CSR performance and innovative ways to encourage the improvement of enterprises and workable improvement of whole society and improve CSR performance and foreign ownership or corporate governance significant role achieves the CSR ownership and performance of companies interest (Guo & Zheng, 2021) managerial ownership and corporate social responsibility have a relationship industry financial performance and industry financial performance finally exploit (Ilmi et al., 2017; Ali et al., 2022). This study will investigate the critical mass and director independence factors, empirical studies were investigating the insignificant consequences of industries with exposure of governance risk and the institutional factors like ownership concentration, state-owned enterprises and family-owned firms also be considered in this study.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

In the theoretical framework to observe the relationship of corporate governance and corporate social performance but in modern social reasonability discourse stakeholder theory is commonly used the stakeholder's attitude to the expectations and ESG performance are conveyed to be dependent upon non-financial industry-specific features. Moreover, the non-financial firms risk policies are originates subject to industry peer stress and later the industry appropriate perception is also engaged into description but using this context. "Resource dependence theory" (RDT) creates the need for a firm working in an undeveloped method to exchange and gain firm resources for its existence. This theory circulates of performance managerial firm is involves in the reliability of social and human capital of specific members of the corporative panel board(Naveed, Voinea, Ali, Rauf, & Fratostiteanu, 2021)

The agency theory and stakeholder theory to describe corporate social reporting performs previous studies have also used source dependency viewpoints to explain attaining the objectives of CSR and the role of corporative governance, Agency theory declares that companies offer to CSR revelations to report information irregularity between managers and shareholders and legitimacy or stakeholder theories, this theory concentrations on the interests of common shareholders and the resource need perspective, the panel board is measured as the key resources in handling a firms dependencies external environmental, and social challenges(Ullah et al., 2019).

2.1. MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND CSR

The managerial ownership structure impact on CSR significant of the managerial stakeholder's relationship with CSR and CSP and that managerial shareholding, institutional shareholding or ownership stability had significant impact on CSR or CSP and listed companies create that samples were positive impact on sustainable development of enterprises and institutional investor's ownership the foreign institutions could efficiently monitor sustainable development of enterprises, and management encourage enterprises innovation, or promote long term development strategies the relationship board estimate administrative ownership and female on board on corporate social responsibility and ownership structure has too shown as a key mined the relationship between board independence and social performance along with shareholder overview, conducted a comparative and meta-analysis survey for a large number of CSR determinants in many nations calculating ownership structure and managerial state of mind .the features and ownership structure ,board of directors both concept of corporate governance(Kolsi & Muqattash, 2020) the ownership structure and family concentration the companies are categorized by growing privatization in commercial and non-commercial sectors, the family members in management indication to low administrative participation in social activities as management tends to realize the cost of financing in CSR activities are balancing the benefits and that the ownership concentration and control of firms in large family corporate assets results in a common or the lack of transparency and confession so, we accept managerial ownership and CSR negative relationship in both.(Garas & ElMassah, 2018) A manager can explain shareholders' difficulties by attractive them with CSP performs, growing the stockholders' capital as well as business incomes and profits and the managerial ownership and Financial performance, with a positive relationship and discovered the relationship of CSR and managerial ownership create a positive association (Javeed & Lefen, 2019) the managerial ownership a shareholder which in a firm contribute in corporate decision making. The managers will impression that maintains the firm by the owner and the managers will create the firm's performance better by ownership of shares. The ownership of stocks by managers is expected to create managers extra reliable in carrying out firm activities, and that is stability among the interests of manager and shareholders. The better part of ownership share will make managers extra energetic in convention the interests of stockholders. (Adiputra et al., 2020)

H1: Managerial ownership has positive effect with corporate social responsibility.

2.2. CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP AND CSR

The ownership concentration and block ownership states to the point and the ownership concentration in the indicators of limited managers on the panel board and their near family affiliates in corporate stock. The board panel ownership concentration is future impact to the corporation's revelation policy, with CSP discovery in two divergent ways, the first main way as shows that the powerful stakeholders and with the benefits of shareholders and that the executives' ownership of business stock may encourage them to action in a way So, it can be expected that a panel board with the standard stock ownership may inspire CSR repetition and revelation to increase business status to improve effectiveness. This submits ownership concentration a positive relationship between panel board and CSR confession level and, the second main way, which is the main estimation in the literature, recommends a negative relationship among corporate social responsibility CSR and board ownership concentration revelation level for some explanations. First, agreeing to the agency concept, when there is a advanced level of ownership concentration is the less indication irregularity is likely, and the possible for agency engagement is reduced as well.(Qa'dan & Suwaidan, 2019) the ownership concentration for CSR enterprises, has established comparatively little consideration. In one of the few studies examining the relationships between, the financial performance and CSR, corporate governance absorbed on board features and indicated that, CEO duality, board size and the existence of inside directors were harmfully linked to financial performance and ownership concentration was adversely associated with CSR confession. Further as well as the percentage of independent directors on board and the figure of female directors were originate to be positively related to CSR confession and that ownership concentration will negatively independent the relationship between industry's and corporate social responsibility (Akben-Selcuk, 2019) the way of opinion in literature, recommends a negative relationship among corporate social responsibility and board ownership concentration revelation level for some reasons. First, agreeing to the agency theory, fewer information irregularity is expected when there is an upper level of ownership concentration and the possible for agency conflict is reduced. In which kinds the essential agency conflicts to be fewer severe between agents (manager) and principals (shareholders) and controlling more severe between minority and shareholders. Secondly directors acquire information through annual report, directors owns corporate stock and his position board participant through information channels, and reducing the essential for proper CSR revelation the evidence reported by many previous studies in annual reports and show a positive or negative relationship among corporate social responsibility and ownership concentration revelation level.(Qa'dan & Suwaidan, 2019)

H2: Concentration ownership has positive significant effect with corporate social responsibility.

2.3. FAMILY OWNERSHIP

The ownership structure is well defined as the reality of family contributor in the company's (BOD) board of directors or the impact of family participants in decision making. Inspected the relation between in family ownership, competitive advantage and corporate governance, create that family-owned business value making come through governance benefit corporate social performance CSP link between ownership structure. They well have known that family-owned businesses were extra link in CSR activities in evaluation with non-family-owned businesses. Family organizations give importance to the non-financial objectives like CSR in emerging a status, self-family image and spreading resources. Family owned firms involve in non-financial objective or consider non-family shareholders to build their status for the durability of their industry (Mahmood et al., 2020), the family ownership firms face developing analysis by society about their profit and corporate social responsibility CSR doing to confirm that they denote to societal welfare. Therefore, organization in such an industry would like to report corporate social responsibility CSR decision and activities. Family ownership firms controlled operating in high risk industries and compared with low risk industries would have greater corporate social responsibility. This study says that level of industry risk modification have effect the relationship between corporate social

performance and family ownership.(Alsaadi, 2021) family ownership in Malaysian economy more than half of GDP gross national product where family trade it is estimated that family businesses and family organizations are majority of family ownership lies in the hands of family members as sense of family linking and not only that family companies, the family ownership orders the formations of BOD board of directors and not only that, as well as the inspection committee, because the family owner want to control over businesses, they appoint directors among family members. Consequently, it is communal for family-owned businesses to have women directors who related to the supervisory shareholders.(Arujunan, Hashim, & Jamaludin, 2018) the family firms are socially responsibility performs and over reputational effects of social unreliable actions. The firm's reputations care about family members because the reputation of the family's with the reputation of firms, the better family member's impression about them, and the greater the reputation of their firms. We assume the positive effect of reputational concerns family firms' corporate governance benefits, and intergenerational legacy wish.(Canavati, 2018)
H3: Family ownership has positive effect with corporate social responsibility.

2.4. INDUSTRY AFFECTS THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE WITH CSR

The industry is high energy consumption in the old industrial sector with comparatively low invention effectiveness in all developing countries, and firm in the industry have solid motive to discharge from current low-cost competition complete informally responsible performance. (Wang et al., 2021). The relation of combined BGD with CSR performance is, by faraway, encouraging; yet, seeing the combined level of CSR performance or the single measurement of CSR, the multi-measurement environment and scope of the concept acquires discounted. Dissimilar variables for moderation are worked out for market risk exposure industries. Which is recommends the way of impact of BGD on CSP. These disparities in shareholders' approach are regarding industries appearances and environmental performance. (Naveed et al., 2021)
H4: Industry affects positively between ownership structure and corporate social performance.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The first open the CSR concept, speaking not only profit growth but also moral issues. The society has prospects for business firms with esteem to altered issues such as legal, ethical, humanitarian, and financial. Discovered four steps of CSP growth: CSP1 (1950s-1960s) the managers must work gratefully as public representatives and suggested that public interest is basically; CSP2 (1960s-1970s) the societal needs is essential for each association and discovered that legal trade sustainability; CSP3 (1980s-1990s) recommended that organizations create societal agreements involves a moral culture for the benefits of shareholders and societies; CSP4 (1990s-2000s) the corporate social performance disclosure (CSPD) was discovered for emerging countries and the negative impacts of organizations on environment and society, which, as a key concern for firms needs and whole society to set right. Mostly CSPD a measured complete financial appearance (profitability, firm size and leverage) has been widely defined for developed countries in this literature (Javeed & Lefen, 2019).



Figure 1

Managerial ownership is well defined as the whole proportion of shares held by managers and executives, or board of directors described agency arguments of owner and managers could be developed by managerial ownership. Stockholders who have trade of shares transmission voting rights and join in shareholders meetings and entrance to firm controlling and the ability to compact with social performance and positive relationship of managerial ownership and corporate social performance (CSP)(Javeed & Lefen, 2019) ownership concentration is well defined as a part of share held by the top five shareholders and ten percentage or additional of shares held by top five shareholders and ownership concentration provides chance to for mangers and monitoring shareholders to contribute and the Pakistani concentrated ownership mostly controlled by family ownership the ownership concentration has a positive relationship with corporate social performance(CSP)(Javeed & Lefen, 2019) family ownership in all over the world presently Malaysia is of the highly family businesses more than half of gross domestic product GDP and family trade energetic part of economy. Traditional family owned firms are where industries do not grip openness in the businesses practices and yet they still performs a linked trade culture to makers.in term of firms corporate social performance CSP and BGD problems as different firms have different needs and potential over BGD and CSP matters special persons with the family connections, an organization needs to come up with official recommendation implemented from institutional provide family ownership (Arujunan et al., 2018).

4. METHODS

4.1. SAMPLE AND DATA DESCRIPTION

The main objective of this study is to investigate the presence to gathers countless condition of Pakistan equity markets. The KSE 100 is benchmarks and used as proxy for an efficient markets portfolio to estimates risk adjusted returns and the market returns for each stock. The KSE 100 index is value-weighted index of top 295 companies picked across all industries based on market capitalization. This population of this study begins with all non-financial firms listed on Pakistan stock exchanges (PSX) the data has been acquired from stock market for the period of January, 2011 to June, 2020. The samples of 295 out of 416 non-financial firms were selected based on restrictions criteria discussed as follow,(1) firms listed during sample period,(2) firms delisted during sample period to remove the chance of durability bias,(3) firms during sample period corporate restructuring events merger acquisition or split from holding company, and (4) during sample period initial public offering and the data of Pakistan stock exchange (PSX) the data is extracted from Pakistan stock exchange website, the state bank of Pakistan (SBP) website and the annual reports of firm. The variables measurement has done as;

4.2. DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Corporate Social Performance

The corporate social performance (CSP) is dependent variable in this study the corporate social performance test the hypotheses used (CSP) ranking score as the proxy, and the global reporting initiative base standards ranking and the scores of ESG is validity and reliability are measures (Naveed et al., 2021) we used social value contribution per share (SCV) as index for CSR by the following strategy of stock exchange of Pakistan, this index is based the all necessary working for social values as shareholder values of earing per share, Produced society measured values as tax revenues, salaries, interest loan, employee creditors, and other further shareholders values and deducted social cost as a environmental pollution. We calculated social contribution value (SCV) by using resulting formula:(Javeed & Lefen, 2019)

$$CSP = EPS + \frac{(Taxes\ Paid + Social\ Exp + Int.Exp + Emp.Welfare\ Exp - Social\ Cost)}{No\ of\ Shares\ Outstanding} \quad (1)$$

Ownership structure Variables

The board gender diversity (BGD) and ownership structure such as managerial ownership (MO), concentration ownership (CO) is an independent variables the ratio of female on the board as proxy of BGD (Naveed et al., 2021). The ownership structure holds two scopes: concentration ownership and managerial ownership is proportion described, concentration ownership is the top five shareholders and managerial ownership is denoted as a percentage of share held by executives and managers.(Javeed & Lefen, 2019)

$$Concentration\ Ownership = \frac{Shareholding\ of\ Top\ five\ Shareholders}{No.of\ Shares\ Outstanding}$$

$$Mangerial\ Ownership_{i,t} = \frac{Shares\ Held\ by\ Directors\ and\ Executives}{No.of\ Shares\ Outstanding}$$

4.3. INDUSTRY EFFECTS AS A MODERATOR

The industry objective of this study is to examine condition of Pakistan equity markets. The KSE 100 is benchmarks and used as proxy for an efficient markets portfolio to estimates risk adjusted returns and the market returns for each stock. The KSE 100 index is value-weighted index of top 296 companies picked across all industries based on market capitalization. And industry effects calculate by below formula sector of market capitalization dividing total market capitalization.

$$Industry\ Effect_{i,t} = \frac{Sector\_Market\_Capitaliation_{i,t}}{Total\ Market\ Capitalization_{i,t}}$$

The industry as part of two descriptive variables, the comprehensive level and separated methods of ESG risk revelation and moderating variables industries uses, the risk exposure level of industry. IESGRE and the environmental, social, governance industries level risk exposure (Naveed et al., 2021). The past way of evaluating economic performance is gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP), but then GNP and GDP are not simply accessible the IIP is used to participate real output. The IIP cyclical that is decreases in the result of a depression and it increases through economic growth and indicating a helpful correlation between stock performance and IIP. The actual economic activity as proxy acts of IIP.(Chaudhary & Bakhshi, 2021)

Firm reputation use as mediating

Firm reputation mediating role of play in research paper and firm reputation is use as dummy variable binary form if firm include in top hundred firms in stock exchange list every year and to take 1 and other below the top 100 firms is take 0.

4.4. FAMILY OWNERSHIP AS DUMMY VARIABLE

Family ownership is use as dummy variable if a family holds shares 20% or above to total outstanding shares assigned value is 1 and below the 20% assigned 0 values.

4.5. CONTROL VARIABLES

We have taken ownership structure such as managerial ownership and concentration ownership relationship between firms CSP so in this study the control variables included (FAGE) firm age, (ROA) return on assets, (FSIZE) firm size,(FLEVERAGE) financial leverage,(Naveed et al., 2021) we control for profitability (ROA)some of existing work on CSR mentions that profitable organization and society comfort that through likable in CSR activities and the variables was calculating the proportion of total return on total assets. We also control for (FSIZE) firm size. Greater firms are predictable to face higher level of public analysis and regulatory conditions. Therefore that engages in CSR actions to all stockholders needs to meet their and the firm size measured by manipulative the logarithm natural of total assets. We include (FAGE) firm age control variable in econometrics model. The elder firm age is extra CSR revelation. The measured Firm age is a no of year's natural log as the firm's inception. Another control variable (LEV) leverage in way of agency theory firms relates information to minimize their agency cost, and cost of capital result its higher leverage relate information. Leverage was measured as total debt divide by total assets (Zaid, Abuhijleh, & Pucheta-Martínez, 2020).

Table: Econometrics Model

Variables	Abb.	Nature	Measurement
Corporate Social Performance	CSP	Dependent	SCV=EPS + (T.TAX + S.EXP + INT + P.W.EXP – S.COST)/T.EQUITY
Managerial ownership	MO	Independent	Share held by directors and executives
Family ownership	FAM	Independent	Dummy variable (if 20% share held by family to 1 otherwise 0)
Concentrated Ownership	CO	Independent	Top five shareholders
Industry	IND	moderator	Proxy for market capitalization

The corporate social performance relationship with ownership structure such as managerial ownership and concentration ownership and board genders diversity in the industry effect, we work the ordinary least squares (OLS) the regression model which is indicated as follows;

4.6. INDUSTRY AS A MODERATOR

$$CSP_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Man\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_2 Con\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_3 Fam\_own_{i,t} + \beta_4 ROA_{i,t} + \beta_5 TQ_{i,t} + \beta_6 Firm\_Size_{i,t} + \beta_7 Firm\_Age_{i,t} + \beta_8 Fin\_Lev_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

$$CSP_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Man\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_2 Con\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_3 Fam\_own_{i,t} + \beta_4 Man\_Own_{i,t} * Ind\ Effect_{i,t} + \beta_5 Con\_Own_{i,t} * Ind\ Effect_{i,t} + \beta_6\ Fam\_own_{i,t} *\ Ind\ Effect_{i,t} + \beta_7\ ROA_{i,t} + \beta_8 Firm\_Size_{i,t} + \beta_9 Firm\_Age_{i,t} + \beta_{10} Fin\_Lev_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Corporate social responsibility dependent variable CSP measure social contribution values formula, managerial ownership Share held by directors and executives and concentration ownership is Top five shareholders and family ownership is dummy variable and industry as moderator use (proxy for market capitalization risk)all control variables such as FAGE natural log of the numbers of years since the firms inception, ROA the ratio of total return and total assets, LEV the ratio of total debt and total equity, FSIZE natural logarithm of total assets.

4.7. FIRM REPUTATION AS A MEDIATOR

$$CSP_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Man\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_2 Con\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_3 Fam\_own_{i,t} + \beta_4\ ROA_{i,t} + \beta_5 TQ_{i,t} + \beta_6 Firm\_Size_{i,t} + \beta_7 Firm\_Age_{i,t} + \beta_8 Fin\_Lev_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

$$Firm\_ReP_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Man\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_2 Con\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_3 Fam\_own_{i,t} + \beta_4\ ROA_{i,t} + \beta_5 TQ_{i,t} + \beta_6 Firm\_Size_{i,t} + \beta_7 Firm\_Age_{i,t} + \beta_8 Fin\_Lev_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

$$CSP_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Man\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_2 Con\_Own_{i,t} + \beta_3 Fam\_own_{i,t} + \beta_4 Firm\_Rep_{i,t} + \beta_5 ROA_{i,t} + \beta_6 TQ_{i,t} + \beta_7 Firm\_Size_{i,t} + \beta_8 Firm\_Age_{i,t} + \beta_9 Fin\_Lev_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Corporate social responsibility (CSP) dependent variable CSP measure social contribution values formula, (MAN OWN) is independent variable and the managerial ownership Share held by directors and executives and concentration ownership is independent variable the concentration ownership is Top five shareholders and family ownership is dummy variable and firm reputation is mediating role and use is dummy variable binary form top hundred firm in stock exchange list every year include to take 1 and other is take 0.All control variables such as FSIZE natural logarithm of total assets, ROA ratio of total return and total assets FAGE natural log of the numbers of years since the firms inception, LEV ratio of total debt and total equity.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	CSP	MOWN	COWN	FMO	ROA	TQ	SIZE	AGE	LEV
Mean	73.89	27.92	66.51	0.51	8.88	1.69	15.39	38.11	1.66
Median	29.12	17.69	69.52	1.00	7.65	1.22	15.38	35.00	1.11
Maximum	3064.05	98.85	99.85	1.00	172.65	25.59	20.57	108.00	81.12
Minimum	-13.97	0.00	0.00	0.00	-71.24	-4.51	8.78	5.00	-84.92
Std. Dev.	171.87	29.28	21.10	0.50	13.92	1.65	1.70	15.99	6.26
Skewness	7.92	0.72	-0.57	-0.04	1.21	4.86	-0.04	0.52	1.39
Kurtosis	98.81	2.23	2.69	1.00	15.60	42.36	3.35	3.06	73.80
Observations	2640	2650	2650	2650	2650	2650	2650	2650	2650

The description statistics have been presented in table 1.The average value of CSP is 73.90. The mean value of MOWN, COWN and FOWN are 27.92, 66.51 and 0.51, respectively, and standard deviation of corporate social performance 171.87 proves high potential and worthy variables related to others. Corporate social responsibility dependent variable CSP measure social contribution values formula, managerial ownership Share held by directors and executives and concentration ownership is Top five shareholders and family ownership is dummy variable and all control variables such as FAGE natural log of the number of years since the firms inception, ROA ratio of total return and total assets, LEV ratio of total debt and total equity, FSIZE natural logarithm of total assets.

Table 2: Correlation Matrix

	CSP	MOWN	COWN	FMO	ROA	TQ	SIZE	AGE	LEV
CSP	1.0000	-0.0238	0.0676	-0.0172	0.0770	0.0370	0.0391	0.0124	0.0325
MOWN	-0.0238	1.0000	0.0711	0.6769	-0.1197	-0.2078	-0.2750	-0.1043	-0.0211
COWN	0.0676	0.0711	1.0000	-0.1841	0.1150	0.0964	0.1061	0.1504	0.0179
FMO	-0.0172	0.6769	-0.1841	1.0000	-0.1337	-0.2206	-0.3430	-0.0667	-0.0541
ROA	0.0770	-0.1197	0.1150	-0.1337	1.0000	0.4818	0.2049	-0.0031	-0.0255
TQ	0.0370	-0.2078	0.0964	-0.2206	0.4818	1.0000	0.1670	0.0725	-0.0037
SIZE	0.0391	-0.2750	0.1061	-0.3430	0.2049	0.1670	1.0000	0.0710	0.0350
AGE	0.0124	-0.1043	0.1504	-0.0667	-0.0031	0.0725	0.0710	1.0000	0.0098
LEV	0.0325	-0.0211	0.0179	-0.0541	-0.0255	-0.0037	0.0350	0.0098	1.0000

In the following Table 2, the presence to check the multi co-linearity and correlation exploration is used now and all descriptive variables compare less than 0.67, which indications no problem of multi co-linearity and correlation can exist between +1 and -1 when it is close a correlate and to issue of endogenous. The CSR and concentration ownership positive and managerial ownership and family have negative correlation matrix corporate social responsibility. Table 3 represents the results of OLS regressions and moderate role of industry as using the following models, respectively.

The result of models OLS in Table 3 have been show and the Model 1 shows the through impact of ownership structure on corporate social responsibility performance representing the hypothesis of verification and positive or significant relationship managerial ownership and corporate social performance the result of positive or significant show in first hypothesis (H1) -0.4154 (-2.12***) and mediating effect is positive-0.4151 (-2.1187**) but moderating effect is negative-0.0487 (-1.4492) and positive or more significant relationship concentration ownership and corporate social performance or the second hypothesis more significant positive relationship show (H2) 0.6311 (3.73***) or mediating effect also positive0.6389 (3.781***) and moderating effect of industry is negative 0.0093 (0.3133) And positive or significant relationship family ownership and corporate social performance and the result of significant or positive show in (H3) 21.722 (1.954**) and mediating effect is that 23.074(2.59**) but the negative effect of moderating effect of 2.9451(1.4258) the result of Model 2 show the relationship between industry (proxy for market capitalization) and CSP. And moderating role of industry is insignificant and the model 1 ownership structure impact on CSR and mediating effect of firm reputation results highly significant as compare to moderating effect of industry.

Table 4 Results of GMM regressions and mediating role of firm reputation and moderating effect of industries are as using the following models, respectively.

Table 3: Regression

Variable	Model 1	Mediator effect	Moderator Effect
FIRM_REPO		8.1942 (1.02931)	
IND			-4.2109 (-0.7284)
MOWN	-0.4154 (-2.12**)	-0.4151 (-2.1187**)	-0.0487 (-1.4492)
COWN	0.6311 (3.73***)	0.6389 (3.781***)	0.0093 (0.3133)
FMO	21.722 (1.954**)	23.074 (2.59**)	2.9451 (1.4258)
FSIZE	2.638 (2.94*)	2.4035 (2.596***)	0.6892 (2.089**)
AGE	-0.090 (-0.4302*)	-0.0818 (-0.3873)	-0.0111 (-0.3438)
LEVA	-12.937 (-1.7415*)	-13.126 (-1.814*)	-1.1872 (-0.8199)
LEVE	0.926 (1.741*)	0.9579 (1.79*)	0.098 (1.5256)
ROA	0.545 (1.817*)	0.4978 (1.6377*)	0.0448 (0.9515)
R-squared	0.01232	0.012721	-0.11545
Adjusted R-squared	0.0097	0.009724	-0.118837
S.E. of regression	170.8988	170.8969	181.6517
Sum squared resid	76988094	76957150	86947949
Log likelihood	-17340.7	-17340.13	-17501.49
Durbin-Watson stat	0.116333	0.116464	0.110613
Observations	2644	2644	2644

Table 4: GMM

Variable	Model 2	Mediator Effect	Moderator Effect
FIRM_REPO		8.1942 (1.02931)	
IND			-13.22 (-1.5072)
MOWN	-0.4154 (-2.12**)	-0.4151 (-2.118**)	-0.1914 (-4.04***)
COWN	0.6311 (3.739***)	0.6389 (3.78***)	0.1435 (3.236***)
FMO	21.722 (1.954**)	23.074 (2.061**)	14.108 (4.69***)
FSIZE	2.6389 (2.94***)	2.4035 (2.59***)	0.856 (1.68*)
AGE	-0.0908 (-1.789*)	-0.0818 (-0.3873)	-0.0919 (-1.885**)
LEVA	-12.937 (-1.78*)	-13.126 (-1.814*)	-3.1653 (-1.4627)
LEVE	0.926 (1.741*)	0.9579 (1.797*)	0.1970 (1.97**)
ROA	0.5458 (1.817*)	0.4978 (1.6377*)	0.1844 (2.70***)
R-squared	0.0123	0.012721	-0.144183
Adjusted R-squared	0.0097	0.009724	-0.147657
S.E. of regression	170.899	170.8969	183.9764

Durbin-Watson stat	0.11633	0.116464	0.141752
J-statistic	0.0032	0.082264	264.56***
Observations	2644	2644	2644

In the table 4 shows the GMM the generalize method of movement used correct assessment for panel data. The panel data used for dynamic combined moment and conditions, when the coefficient of the legged dependent variable is near 0.87, the panel data GMM estimation is suggested for evaluating. Thereof the model 2 managerial ownership impact on CSR positive significant H1 -0.4154 (-2.12**) and mediating and moderating impact also positive and highly significant -0.4151 (-2.118**) and -0.1914 (-4.04***) the H2 concentration ownership impact on CSR highly significant positive 0.6311 (3.739***) and highest level of significance mediating (firm reputation) 0.6389 (3.78***) and moderating (non-financial industries) 0.1435 (3.236***) and that the family ownership significant positive impact on corporate social performance H3 21.722 (1.954**) and mediating significant impact level 23.074 (2.061**) and but moderating effect of industries highly significant level 14.108 (4.69***) concentration ownership highly impact on corporate social performance as compare to managerial and family ownership in the model 2 the GMM generalized movement of method ownership structure impact of corporate social performance highly significance level mediating essential role of firm reputation and importance of moderating effect positive significance sustainability performance of industry.

The analysis of a robustness test is used to check the research results validity. In the above table show ownership structure significant impact on corporate social responsibility and mediating or moderating sustainability is positive significant effect. The result of corporate social performance and managerial ownership, concentration ownership, and family ownership are significant level of top and bellow to 1 per cent sustainability the results show very reliable and significant.

Table 5: RUBOUSTNESS

Variable	Model 3	Mediator Effect	Moderator Effect
FIRM_REPO		2.9823 (1.81*)	
IND			-2.209 (-1.622*)
MOWN	0.0658 (1.63*)	0.0637 (1.5719)	-0.0172 (-2.171**)
COWN	-0.0130 (-0.3741)	-0.0111 (-0.3200)	-0.0103 (-1.4654)
FMO	-1.7282 (-0.7544)	-1.1381 (-0.4915)	0.9889 (2.03**)
FSIZE	1.5070 (8.15***)	1.4385 (7.51***)	0.3645 (4.69***)
AGE	0.200 (4.60***)	0.2038 (4.65***)	0.0155 (2.02**)
LEVA	-1.124 (-0.7544)	-1.2759 (-0.8527)	-0.3363 (-0.9858)
LEVE	0.1799 (1.64*)	0.1897 (1.72*)	-0.3363 (2.70***)
ROA	0.2218 (3.58***)	0.2067 (3.28***)	-0.3363 (2.43**)
Robust Statistics			
R-squared	0.0125	0.0130	-0.186364
Rw-squared	0.034338	0.036287	-0.353652
Akaike info criterion	3975.236	3946.962	4465.822
Deviance	4880803	4925720	6439693
Rn-squared statistic	2149.96***	2156.48***	818.66***
Non-robust Statistics			
Mean dependent var	73.88523	73.88523	73.88523
S.E. of regression	176.9378	176.9153	182.9728
S.D. dependent var	171.7339	171.7339	171.7339
Sum squared resid	82525208	82472936	88217295
Observations	2644	2644	2644

5. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

In the result ownership structure has on corporate social performance is comparatively an under studied occurrence although Pakistani comprehensive activities to the inspire ownership structure in business panels. The main objective was to subway through this investigation the correlation between the CSP in the terms of industry market capitalization risk exposure. In This study was established on 2644 firm year interpretations and that the offer a strong experimental sign that the ownership structure is positively related with the corporate social performance of organizations. We examined the industry result in the correlation between ownership structure and CSP. The important objective of this matter with former studies in this strain of investigation is the useful of basic limitations, and focus main on CSR. In difference, we are working a hard research project for the investigation of the industry consequence. The industry effect, simultaneously in relations of comprehensive and separated Proxy for market capitalization risk revelations, recommended an additional physical inculcation of that the framework of altered non-financial industries in relations of their economic financial effect, established on involved stakeholder agency theory.

6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Our outcomes have applied theoretical and regulatory, effects. These outcomes suggest that the ownership structure is cooperative in the opportunities of shareholders and managers or executives in the organizations but also that the development their corporate social responsibility however focus as several agency theory and shareholders in graceful of involved stakeholder theory. Furthermore, it recommends that comprising ownership structure such as managerial ownership share held by directors and executives and concentration ownership top five shareholders in a company panel has that this prospective to basis enhancements in the organizations environmental and social risk related to CSP. Managers and stockholders may bonus winning CSP of industries with social risk environmental revelation. In adding, they can appearance connected attainments in industries with market capitalization risk coverage whereas confirming ownership structure shareholders, manager's executive's managements on the company panels of the organizations of these industries. The outcomes also contribution legislators in circulating the regulation to inspire managers, shareholders and executives and family female's occurrence on company leverage boards to environmental, social, and benefit related to governance for a shareholders in broad and society precisely. The stakeholder's theory involved the emerged welfares to the economic remunerations of all the shareholders and includes the whole structure for leveraging. The critical masses are alleged in the prospects of the findings of non-financial industries with market capitalization risk coverage.

7. CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE WORK AND LIMITATIONS

In this study covers the works ownership structure and corporate social performance while including the industry consequence market capitalization into the investigation. The outcomes of this study in ownership structure show that the structure of the non-financial industry adopts separated experiments into the organizations and its panels in relations of corporate social performance and, consequently, different services and proficiency are compulsory to manage with these experiments. The corporate social performance and the appearance of the stakeholder theory for the risk perspective and industry in Proxy for market capitalization effect we hypothesized that the ownership structure has an indirect correlation and with the corporate social responsibility and that the correlation in the non-financial industries with market capitalization risks revelation. There are convinced limits to our investigation, which are counted as follows. First we have data used of Pakistan stock exchange listed non-financial firms, in which is a developing economy and emerging market; consequently, this study may not be proper results generalizable. Upcoming research can study if related results follow in a different institutional framework such as that the one where there is an essential share system for institutional ownership on corporative board panels. There is an opportunity of linking the institutional circumstances the ownership structure whereby is mandatory with those or where it is not. This will be discovering the cons and pros of required and controlled institutional ownership on business panels. the evaluation may also be done among the framework of developing economies and developed economics. And the industry consequence from the perception of market capitalization risk coverage. Next secondly we have instructed only the director objectivity and critical mass issues, while examining the irrelevant outcomes of non-financial industries with market capitalization risk coverage. Factors institutional like institutional ownership and state-owned enterprises, firms and corporative board considers may also be reflected in further studies. Thirdly our study we have used data quantitative method for research. The qualitative method is merging survey data with considered interviews or may result in more perceptive outcomes[3].

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[3] Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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