Islami Jamhoori Ittehad As An Oppositional Alliance

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Abstract

As one of Pakistan’s greatest political coalitions, Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI) had a significant impact on the country’s history. It is believed that IJI was a coalition whose primary objective was to thwart the PPP’s efforts to attain power in whatever way that was possible. Most of the time, oppositional alliances form to fight against the power of the government. The objective of the study was to explore Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI) as an oppositional alliance. Most Pakistani coalitions oppose the army-led government and employ popular agitation to restore parliamentary authority. These coalitions were formed to challenge the army-led administration. In the beginning, the COP engaged in productive criticism of the federal administration in an effort to achieve its goals of a province autonomy, economic and social fairness, Shariah enforcement, government accountability, genuine federal system and increased law and order. COP was perceived as a way to disapprove the budget to debunk PPPs. Horse trafficking, political bribery, and corruption marred Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s no-confidence vote. Benazir gathered her people in Sawai to oppose this. Benazir claims that in 1989, with the help of the ISI and the Army, a motion of no confidence was filed against her, and that she was a major target. Key players in this motion included Hussain, Qazi HA, Nawaz Sharif, and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. Jatoi said the opposition drafted a no-confidence resolution because corruption is worsening. Sindh is in chaos, inflation and prices are rising, and the government is making poor domestic and international decisions. Throughout the years 1988 and 1990, the political scene was dominated by conflicts similar to these. IJI and PPP misled each other’s reputation to limit their vote banks. To achieve this purpose, they risked public attention. Both IJI and PPP utilized their power to tarnish each other. This technique hurt both parties, strained the national budget, and didn’t solve people’s issues.

Keywords: Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI), Oppositional alliances, Political maneuvering, Power struggles, Pakistan

1. Introduction

Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI) was one of the largest political groups to ever come together in Pakistan. It has been speculated that it is a coalition of right-wing parties. IJI is also thought to have been an alliance with the purpose of preventing PPP from gaining power in any way possible. The political parties forming this alliance were PML (N), “Jamiat-Ulama-i-Islam” (JUI) “Dakhwasthi group”, “National Peoples Party” (NPP), “Markazi Jamaat-i-Ahle Hadith” (MJAH-L) (Lakhvi-Group), “Jamiat Mashaiikh” (JM) (Sahibzada Fazal-e-Haq Group), “Hizb-e-Jihad” (HJ) and “Independent Parliamentary Group” (IPG). This political alliance consisted of both conservative religious and liberal political groups working together. It was a common misconception that it consisted of nine parties; however, this was not the case. This confusion is caused by the nine stars on the flag, which were merely an indication of the cohesion of the PNA to indicate the seriousness of the purpose regarding the execution of Nizam-e Mustafa and a position opposed to the PPP. The PML, the HJ, the JI, the JUI-D, the JM, the NPP, the IPG and the MJAH-L were the eight political groups that came together in 1988 to form the IJI (Mehra et al., 2003). With the benefit of hindsight and an analysis of the competing parties’ careful, well-thought-out strategy, it is evident that the coalition’s principal purpose was to challenge the PPP’s dominance after the National Assembly was abolished in 1988. However, this was not the only reason why they formed the coalition. The IJI was the alliance that received the greatest attention during the elections in 1988. As a result of the fact that IJI was a coalition of numerous political parties, its member parties could only come to an agreement on a limited number of basic issues. These issues were subsequently included in IJI’s political agenda, which was subsequently utilized as the organization’s election platform with only minor adjustments. Many different hypotheses might be advanced in order to account for the formation of this partnership (Mehra et al., 2003).

Oppositional alliances generally develop to resist government authoritarianism. A political party coalition is a type of partnership that is created by political parties with the purpose of achieving common goals, such as the toppling of a regime or the approval of particular demands from the government. The forces of the opposition work together on a single platform. Achieving particular goals, such as creating, reversing, or revising a selection of the policies held by political parties, organizations, or interest groups, is the exclusive function of the job. They participate in agitation politics and work to mould public opinion over the shortcomings of governmental policy. They do this so that they can win the support of the average guy. The goal of these coalitions is to either topple the current government or bring about a change in the current regime. Most Pakistani coalitions were opposition alliances that used public agitation to overthrow the army-led government and restore parliamentary rule. Opposition parties, conscious of the fact that they cannot bring about change on their own, collaborate with other political groups in order to increase their chances of winning elections. When this occurs, political parties that have different ideologies will often combine their resources under the same platform and work towards achieving the same objective.

For instance, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was an opposition alliance in 1973 that fought against the Bhutto government (1971-77), and the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was an opposition alliance in Pakistan under the Zia regime (1977-1988). Sometimes an opposition alliance ends up becoming the electoral alliance. For example, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was an opposition alliance in Pakistan during the reign of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977), but it ended up being the electoral alliance in 1977. A political opposition coalition known as the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) ran against Field Marshal Ayub Khan in Pakistan’s presidential election in 1965. This coalition also participated in the election as an electoral alliance. At other instances, opposition parties will link themselves with a particular cause or one point agenda, such as the overthrow of a government.

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At the Assembly that took place between 1988 and 1990, the COP was a political coalition. On January 2, 1989, five political party leaders began discussing the cooperation. The Combined Opposition Parties chose Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi to be the leader of the opposition in the NA (COP). A notice of motion of no confidence was presented against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto by the COP on October 23, 1989. This notice was delivered to the secretary of the National Assembly. The alliance between the PPP and the MQM didn’t last long. After 11 months, the MQM broke its deal with the PPP, saying that the PPP hadn’t met a single condition. On October 23, the MQM announced that it had decided to terminate its participation in the accord. It was a proposal that was proposed jointly by the COP and a number of independent members, among them were four FATA members.

On September 18, 1989, the IJI and MQM signed a political partnership to uphold the constitution and Islamic values. The deal stated that if the IJI-MQM coalition formed a central government, the MQM would support the IJI’s Prime Minister Nomination and the IJI would take the MQM’s cabinet nominee. The Awami National Party (ANP), a PPP ally in the December 1988 alliance government, supported the no-confidence motion against the P.M. The acting ANP president, Hajji Ghulam Ahmad Bilore, said the PPP had never cared for her supporters in the MR.D or the December 1988 parliamentary alliance. On November 1, 1989, a vote and discussion were held over the motion of no confidence. After numerous comments from the head of the opposition, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and the Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, the motion was finally put to a vote, where it was ultimately defeated. The proposal was supported by 107 members of the COP, the MQM, and the ANP. However, 124 members of the National Assembly voted against it. Five people, including Wali Khan, were missing. The vote of no confidence was not exceptional. This catastrophe was the culmination of a series of events. IJI drafted this motion with help of political parties. One of these incidents was the founding of a “Parliamentary Opposition Coalition,” which included the IJI as well as six other political organizations and consisted of a total of 14 political organizations. The name for this group was “Combined Opposition Parties” (COP). IJI played an important part in this. Also participating in the COP were the Pakistan Jamhoori Party, the ANP, and the JUP. Putting together such a large coalition was not a simple task. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi put forth a lot of effort to bring together this alliance, and he did so by holding meetings with important personalities like as Wali Khan, Muhammad Khan Junejo, Nawaz Sharif, Nawab Akbar Bugti and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. The leadership of the IJI claims that the COP works as barrier to implement decisions (The Nation, 1989; Jang, 1989). In the beginning, the COP engaged in productive criticism of the federal administration in an effort to achieve its goals of a province autonomy, economic and social fairness, Shariah enforcement, government accountability, genuine federal system and increased law and order (The Nation, 1989).

The COP showed PPPs negligence in delaying the budget. However, due to a variety of issues, the COP was unable to exert enough pressure on the government to get it to follow its agenda. Concerns were voiced by a number of political factions on the possibility of joining this union. The JUI-F, the BNA, and the ANP came to the conclusion that the best way to address their issues was to form an alliance that would oppose the PPP. The IJI’s desire to become a member of the COP was supported by the Central Working Committee of the PML (Nasir et al., 1990). On October 28, 1989, the MQM broke its deal with the PPP and agreed to attend the COP and vote against Benazir in the no-confidence motion. This caused the PPP to consider the MQM to have broken its agreement with the PPP (Bukhari et al., 2004).

Despite the fact that the foundation of the COP was impeded by confrontations between opposing political factions, the fear of a common foe kept them together. Hence, the COP may be seen as a coalition of various conservative parties like the IJI and various left-wing organizations like BNP in Baluchistan and as well as ANP in the NWFP. This is because of the fact that the COP has brought together parties from both sides of the political spectrum. On June 4, 1989, it was formally announced that the COP will be established. It was decided that Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi will serve as the chairperson of the COP in the NA. Because Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi lacked political backing in Sindh and was need to compete in elections in Punjab, many people were hostile to the concept. Some people were suspicious of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi’s background because of his Sindhi heritage. Due to the fact that he was ZAB’s closest confidant, very few people questioned his history (Iftikhar & Khawaja, 1989). Although important COP leaders refuted this theory, numerous people felt that Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi’s nomination as leader of the opposition in the NA was made with G. I. Khan’s collaboration. This was the case despite the fact that key COP leaders opposed it. Members of the PML and the JII proposed that the leader of the opposition should originate from a party that has a sizeable presence in the National Assembly, such as the PML (Zulfiqar & Raja, 1989).

Members of the PML voted in favour of Abida Hussain, but members of the JI and JUI (D) voted against the idea, citing the fact that they did not want a woman to lead them as their leader. It was decided not to nominate Abida Hussain for the role of Leader of the Opposition in the NA in order to avoid more controversy surrounding the matter (Hussain, Syeda Abida, 1989). The vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was marred by scandals involving horse trafficking, political bribery, and corruption. Benazir called her people together at Sawat in order to counteract this approach. Members of the PPP whose loyalties had been put into question were barred from voting, while members of the IJI were incarcerated to prevent them from casting ballots. The number of IJI members were bribed with the help of considerable amounts of money and assurances of future benefits from the Ministry. Nawaz Sharif utilized similar strategies in the province of Punjab in order to construct a front block of PPP members and win the support of PPP MNAs. According to Benazir, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Nawaz Sharif, Qazi HA, and Hussain had a significant role in the filing of a vote of no confidence against her in 1989, with the assistance of the ISI and the Army. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was of the opinion that the outcomes would be different if each and every member had the opportunity to vote. On the other hand, the PPP was successful in sabotaging it by bringing the total number of MNAs working in the PM Secretariat down to barely twenty. In addition, the COP entertained its adherents at hotels located outside of Islamabad, complete with safety precautions, in order to maintain unity among its members. Before introducing the motion in Parliament, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi conferred with a number of illustrious individuals, including Wyne, Rasheed, Shujaat, Sharif, Muhammad Khan Junejo, Nasrullah Khan, Pagara, Fazal and Haq. Among those with whom he conferred were also Wyne and Nasrullah Khan. These sessions, it is said by some sources, prepared for an October 1989 vote of no confidence. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi reported to the IJI leadership that he had discussed the IJI’s motion
of no confidence against the Prime Minister with ten members from Punjab, five members from tribal areas, four members from Baluchistan, and eleven members from Sindh. All of these individuals had expressed their willingness to back the motion.

Some members of the COP worked to strengthen their relationships with PPP MNAs in order to win over their support for the idea. It was discovered that a PPP dissident by the name of Makhdoom Khaliquzaman could be reached, and Zaman made it clear that he backs the COP. There were rumblings that Malik Meraj Khalid, the Speaker of the National Assembly, would be resigning his position. Several people had the suspicion that he might be offered the position of Prime Minister in the event that there was a change in administration, but he categorically rejected the offer. The coalition said 94 National Assembly members were on its side. According to Jatoi, the opposition drafted a resolution of no confidence because corruption is becoming worse, there is anarchy in Sindh, inflation and price increases, and the government is making poor decisions both domestically and internationally. According to Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the choice was made keeping in mind what was most beneficial to the nation as a whole. The Secretary Assembly’s notice of no-confidence resolution against Prime Minister Benazir in October 1989 sparked political maneuvering in the National Assembly (Khan & Kamran, 1989).

IJI had the intention of requesting a show of hands after they had presented their plan; however, according to the statute that is currently in place, voting can take place three days after it has been presented, and the speaker has the ability to postpone it for up to seven days. According to IJI, the break could result in issues due to the possibility that MNAs would return to the PPP or that their allegiance would change away from IJI. The PPP, however, made every effort to defeat the motion, so the limits could not be relaxed even if they were revised. At the moment, the IJI had 98 members, but they intended to use 119 against Benazir. It was decided that Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi would serve as the country’s future prime minister in the event that a motion of no confidence was successful. On the day of the election, additional security precautions were put into place to facilitate members’ access to Parliament House. Only 12 people voted against the idea, so it was narrowly turned down (Khan & Kamran, 1989).

In December of 1988, Benazir received 148 votes, while the opposition obtained just 55 votes. Nevertheless, the opposition garnered 107 votes in November of 1989, which alarmed the PPP. On November 12, 1989, Benazir chose three members of the opposition to serve as ministers in her government. Moreover, there was one more factor that contributed to Benazir’s ability to live. Since Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was a close ally of Nawaz Sharif, in the event that the motion of no confidence was successful, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi would succeed Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister, and there would be no reluctance in calling for mid-term elections.

Although there is little evidence to corroborate this claim, there are other factors to take into account, including the fact that the IJI had the required number of MNA votes yet Nawaz Sharif still refused to stand with the motion. The manner in which Nawaz Sharif conducts himself gives the impression that he intends to become Prime Minister as soon as that job is open. Second, the sudden departure of numerous persons is a warning sign that something fishy is going on. These elements cannot be ignored, yet they do not contribute any proof. According to Nawaz Sharif, the effort was unsuccessful because four members of the IJI were there at the time: Ghulam Ahmad Maneka, Ch. Anwar Aziz, Makhdoom Ahmad Anwar Aalam, and Shabbir Ahmad. It was reported that these MPs signed the motion of no confidence, but after further consideration, they decided against doing so (Khan & Kamran, 1989).

As a consequence of this decision, a number of PPP members who had previously stated that they would back IJI ultimately decided against doing so, bringing the total number of IJI followers down to 104. Nawaz Sharif and Muhammad Khan Junejo both agreed that league members who voted against the IJI’s motion of no confidence should be punished. IJI’s close relationship with the MQM made it difficult for PPP MNAs in Sindh to back the organization. The selection of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as Prime Minister was opposed by a number of PML members in the event that the motion of no confidence was succeeded. They claimed that the PML had a majority in the NA and that no one could ever become Prime Minister without having their party represented in the NA. They also claimed that the PML was the only party that had a majority in the NA. Moreover, they stated that the PML had a majority in the NA. The idea of holding a vote of no confidence was shot down by a number of members of the IJI. They requested that the democratic process be allowed to take its course. They were of the opinion that even if the vote of no confidence was successful, the government would still not have much influence. After spending a significant amount of money on the election campaign, they contended that it would be financially impossible for them to run another campaign in such a short amount of time. Some critics said that individuals who opposed the decision lacked clarity regarding whether or not they would be eligible for reelection to the assembly in the event that new elections were held. It was argued that a vote of no confidence will help in the development of a strong administration, which was one of the arguments in favour of the vote (Khan & Kamran, 1989).

Once the vote of no confidence was successful, it was widely anticipated that a new prime minister would be chosen with the support of a number of political parties. To form a strong national and provincial government, this new prime minister would ask the president to dissolve the parliament and call new elections. Although none of these reasons were decisive in the motion’s defeat, they all contributed to the inability of the COP to destabilize the PPP administration. As a direct result of this decision, Sindhi politics underwent a profound transformation. The MQM made the announcement regarding the signing of their agreement with IJI on September 18th, 1989. Agreement wasn’t feasible. Most people and professionals believe the arrangement was made to save face. IJI's money and other resources influenced MQM leadership. Once the motion was shot down, the MQM deepened its partnership with Jiye Sindh, which contributed to an increase in the country’s law and order issues.

As a result of the deterioration in the situation, Chief Minister Sindh tendered his resignation on February 23, 1990. The IJI had planned to offer a second motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister during the September-October 1990 session of the NA; however, the motion was not brought forward until after the NA had been dissolved. Qazi Hussain Ahmad and a lot of other people thought the no-confidence motion was bad for a number of reasons. According to his estimation, the first stage would cost approximately 13 billion Pakistani rupees; this would be too expensive for a developing country like Pakistan. Qazi HA argued that IJI ought to centre its efforts on improving its organization. As G. I. Khan was explaining the reasons for the dissolution of the NA, he stated that the methods utilized to pay opposition party members in order to acquire their sympathies were shameful. This was one of the reasons for the dissolution of the NA. MNAs were actively sought out and rewarded with lands, licenses, and even
ministries of their choosing. Some of the members were given land, and others were given loans. Those individuals who did not switch their loyalties were rewarded by the political parties that they had previously supported. The instability of the government, which was made worse by horse-trading within the assemblies, was one of the things that led to the NA and PA falling apart. A convention of the members of the Senate, the National Assembly, and the Provincial Assembly of the COP took place on May 24th, 1990. At this convention, allegations of bribery and other forms of corruption were levelled against many ministers of the PPP government.

During Pakistan’s political history, smaller provinces like NWFP and Baluchistan have frequently been ruled by opposition parties. On the other hand, the fact that a number of different political groups came together to form a coalition government in the Punjab and the Center was an unusual circumstance that turned out to be fraught with conflicts and difficulties. During that time period (1988–1990), the political landscape was dominated by conflicts of this nature. Both the IJI and the PPP had the intention of distorting the reputation of the other in order to limit the vote bank of the other, and as a result, they did their best to distort each other’s reputations. In order to achieve their objective, they did not hesitate to put the welfare of the general population in jeopardy. Both the IJI and the PPP exploited the power that they held in order to smear the reputation of the other party. This approach was not only detrimental to both parties involved, but it also increased the strain on the national budget and failed to address the issues faced by average citizens. Federal government delayed inauguration of Nawaz Sharif as CM. This was followed by the movement of important officials to new positions. In terms of both population and economic expansion, Punjab is the most populated and dynamic province in the Indian subcontinent. It had never before been required to be concerned about central discrimination. The IJI government was the first to express concern regarding the possibility of discrimination at the federal level. IJI’s stance endeared it to the people of Baluchistan, and as a result, they searched for opportunities to collaborate with the government of Punjab. Both sides fought for different reasons. IJI sought national power, whereas Nawab Akbar Bugti sought regional privileges. The Punjab government took a number of steps to address the fear of discrimination. Some of these steps were useful and helped the IJI take the lead, while others were criticized by members of alliance and as well as public as having the potential to make things worse between the provinces (Ahmad & Mushtaq, 1989).

2. Conclusion

The majority of the coalitions in Pakistan are made up of opposition alliances, which were formed to fight against the army-led administration and to bring back parliamentary rule through the use of popular agitation. In the beginning, the COP engaged in productive criticism of the federal administration in an effort to achieve its goals of a province autonomy, economic and social fairness, Shariah enforcement, government accountability, genuine federal system and increased law and order. COP showed PPPs negligence in delaying the budget. Horse trafficking, political bribery, and corruption marred PM Benazir Bhutto’s no-confidence vote. Benazir gathered her people in Sawat to oppose this. Benazir claims that in 1989, with the help of the ISI and the Army, a motion of no confidence was filed against her, and that she was a major target. Key players in this motion included Nawaz Sharif, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Qazi HA, and Hussain. Jatoi said the opposition drafted a no-confidence motion because corruption is worsening. Sindh is in chaos, inflation and prices are rising, and the government is making poor domestic and international decisions. Opposition parties have ruled NWFP and Baluchistan many times. Nonetheless, the Punjab and Center coalition administration was unusual and fraught with conflict. Throughout the years 1988 and 1990, the political scene was dominated by conflicts similar to these. IJI and PPP misled each other’s reputation to limit their vote banks. They were not afraid to put the welfare of the general population in jeopardy in order to achieve their objective. Both the IJI and the PPP took advantage of their powerful position to smear the reputation of the opposing party. This approach was not only detrimental to both parties involved, but it also increased the strain on the national budget and failed to address the issues faced by average citizens.

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