



STRATEGIES AND METHODS OF DE-RADICALIZATION IN PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

Pakistani society has suffered decades of radicalism and violent extremism, eventually leading to radicalization. The goal of this study is to look at various deradicalization trends, methodologies, and tactics to explore the general concerns of deradicalization programs in Pakistan. This article explains the three steps of deradicalization: the efficient use of deradicalization for protection, preparedness, and prevention in Pakistan. Even though Pakistan is a breeding hub for radicalization, still, the nation has unable to create a comprehensive deradicalization operation. Deradicalization programs mostly supervised by the military, centered Swat valley, Pakistan's military and civil society organizations have attempted to oppose deadly terrorist ideology, but the government has failed to take-action. Most deradicalization training in Pakistan emphasizes economic incentives and alternative livelihood adjustments but the current scenario is very infuriating and many political parties and organizations are involved in radical terrorist acts. State and federal governments must create and implement comprehensive anti-radicalization programs before it is too late to prevent continuous brutal killing by extremists. Various political parties, religious groups, denominations, the media, and civil society organizations must reach an agreement on the total rejection of radicals in society. This article outlines significant tactics and strategies employed in Pakistan and gives final recommendations at the individual and social levels through family participation and internet deradicalization.

Keywords: Extremism, deradicalization, terrorist attacks, security

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1. INTRODUCTION

The whole idea of deradicalization is one argued about extensively among the experts in the field. To begin with, they haven't even decided on a universal definition for deradicalization (John et al., 2012) nor have they agreed on what can be considered a successful deradicalization attempt. Many scholars use the term 'deradicalization' as being synonymous with 'counter-radicalization' and 'rehabilitation' (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Although, the biggest difference between the two is that deradicalization is the post-radicalization efforts while counter-radicalization is the pre-radicalization efforts. Furthermore, disengaging from a radicalized group, i.e., no longer being a part of said group is different from deradicalization. Rehabilitation is a term close to deradicalization as it is defined as the process of helping the disengaged members of a radicalized group to better integrate back into society (Rabasa, 2010; Imran et al., 2021). As mentioned before, 'Deradicalization' is the disassociation of an individual from a radicalized idea or group, whether done voluntarily or not, while 'Counter-Radicalization' is the preventive measures to radicalization i.e., steps taken before radicalization and as such are not responsive like deradicalization. The first step towards a successful deradicalization attempt is to understand the nature of radicalization. Normally a person becomes radicalized in the influence of other radicalized individuals. Although this study does not go too deeply on the topic of radicalization, some paths to radicalization are necessary to be discussed when talking about deradicalization. As it is noted, knowing the path to a radicalization of a person helps in the deradicalization of them. It is to be noted that radicalization and deradicalization both are greatly influenced by the families and friends of person, it is also of much concern

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that in recent times, the internet has been observed to play a larger role in the radicalization of many individuals (Amnesty International. 2016).

Deradicalization programs' which aim to better rehabilitate an individual into the society, moving them away from radicalization have been observed to pick up great attention from the masses in the last few years. Although these programs are greatly varied in their targeted population (e.g. terrorists, extremists, prisoners, criminals, etc.), objectives (e.g. changing their thinking, disengagement from the radicalized groups, reinstating them into society, etc.) and efforts (from providing job opportunities, helping in their marriages and establishing new lives for them to just instructing them regarding their radicalized and extreme behavior), some commonalities between the problems faced by these programs can be deduced. As recent reports show deradicalized individuals to again become radicalized, voices were raised regarding the effectiveness of such deradicalization attempts and the best strategies to implement in this regard (Khalid & Leghari, 2014). Different countries have shown different approaches to deradicalization. After the tragedies of 9/11 and the Bali attacks of 2002, countries like Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Yemen were the first to introduce deradicalization programs within their countries. Now known as the "first-generation" deradicalization programs, these programs aimed to provide education and rehabilitation to prisoners and incarcerated individuals alongside monitoring their actions. Such programs primarily focused on re-educating them on theology alongside providing them with occupational training (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017; Imran et al., 2022). Such programs have now developed into being more individualized taking into account the individual's social and cultural situations. Commonly in the western civilization, such programs have developed into also including broadening the individual's engagement with different communities and developing resilience in them. Such steps and studies have helped them in also improving their counter-radicalization programs. Nevertheless, evaluation still proves problematic since there is an absence of baselines and counterfactuals, alongside disagreement on what success would mean in such programs. Moreover, these programs usually do not make their information publicly available making it difficult for academics and researchers to access (Koehler, 2017).

Deradicalization is the process of assisting people to abandon radicalized ideas and groups, forswear violence as a method to bring social change and be more accepting towards the opinions of others (Rabasa, 2010). Even though many programs are putting much effort towards deradicalization, Pakistan is one of the countries lacking much to show for its efforts, not even a cohesive strategy to solve this issue. For now, most programs of deradicalization in Pakistan are dispersed across the land with greatly varied procedures and results. Although different approaches are required to deal with different situations, the point of concern lies in the lack of any central body to direct such programs (Greer & Ryan, 2016). The primary policy of the Government of Pakistan regarding counter-extremism is made by the NAP, established in 2015 after the Army Public School, Peshawar got attacked by terrorists. Many steps taken by the NAP have proven effective in hindering the operations of many radicalized groups. Even though the government has taken considerable steps against militant radicalized groups, like closing bank accounts (Zahid, 2018), other such groups have not received their due attention. Referencing to the funds raised by Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which raised its funds through a separate organization (Zafar, 2016). But such attempts also tread the risks of violating the human rights of many individuals, and such oppression may cause unwanted backlash and worsen the situation. Many concerns (Amnesty International, 2016) are raised regarding the military trials of the masses and the military operations in Karachi by the human rights organizations of those areas. For instance, Sindh and Balochistan saw an increase in extra-judicial killings since NAP came into existence (Rizvi & Farheen, 2016).

Many participants in the NAP were aware and raised voices regarding the primary issue with the system that their approach was too narrow-minded, focused on solving issues through military might and not thinking of the long-term effects of such actions nor considering the roots of such radicalization. Naumann Suleman proposed the educational efforts needed for the reformation of deradicalized individuals and a new policy named the new "National Counter Extremism Policy (NCEP)" was formed from a multitude of consultations, as described by the participants. Such steps are hoped to improve the effectiveness of the NAP and its efforts to combat radicalization (Ahmad, 2018). These programs were selected for the following reasons:

1. They recognize Islamic extremism and radicalization as a threat and work to combat this issue, thus proving to not overlook the major issues.
2. They seem to be effective in their methods.
3. Out of the three, two of them focus on the importance of Madrassas in correcting the Islamic teachings for the radicalized groups.

4. All three of them believe Islamic teachings to be the most effective methods in the deradicalization of extremist individuals.
5. These programs also provide Policy advice for both Pakistan and America to better deal with radicalization based upon collaboration between different NGOs and the public.

Most of the population of Pakistan is against radicalism and militant groups. Despite this, there is a significant number of radicalized organizations and individuals present in Pakistan, forming both militant and non-militant groups. Alongside the military efforts to counter radicalism, many NGOs are also working to combat radicalism through creating local ownerships and local capacities. Both projects provide promising aspects for the continuance of the deradicalization program (Qazi, 2013). Deradicalization attempts must be so executed as to not violate the basic rights and sacred beliefs of the public. The largest step for Pakistan in this regard would be to deal with the misinterpretations of Islamic guidance to justify terrorism and extremist acts. This in turn would also include stepping away from the narrative of Sunni being the prime citizens of the nation to the formation of such a nation where differences in religious, political, and social ideals are not only accepted but celebrated. The judiciary system ought to act without discrimination and prejudice (Greer & Ryan, 2016). For now, our efforts towards deradicalization have mostly been focused on militants- low-level suppliers and soldiers. Much less attention is being given to the rehabilitation efforts of these deradicalized individuals and the high-risk organizations working in the country. The high-ranking individuals in these organizations must be dealt with as this would prove to be one of the more effective steps in dealing with a radicalized organization. Indonesia gets the deradicalized extremists to help in the deradicalization process, Saudi Arabia makes an effort to keep the low threat extremists away from the high threat ones to avoid radicalization of such individuals. In contrast, Pakistani jails make no such efforts thus giving them an environment where radicalization becomes easy. Many prisons in the country have severely lax security, allowing the captured high-risk individuals to run their operations easily from within their cells by the means of phone calls (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

Deradicalization in Pakistan should begin with a country-wide project, the center of which may be Islamabad. Taking a note from the Saudi efforts, the program should target the political and social landscapes in their entirety, not just some fragmented operations here and there. Moreover, despite the military operations to combat the anti-state extremists proving much fruitful, the political landscape is a different one altogether, one which requires a more delicate and planned approach to deal with the 'Jihadists' committing terrorist acts throughout the world (Rana, 2011). Such efforts can only be successful if a national narrative of tolerance and pluralism is embraced by the policymakers and the people of the land. Regrettably, since its liberation, Pakistani society has been split along ethnic and sectarian fissures, which have since been used by groups to create deeper divides in the nation. The National Action Plan (NAP) emphasizes the government's counter-radicalism and counter-terrorism techniques by declaring harsher punishments for militancy and implementing concrete measures to smother terrorist organizations by cutting off their economic lifelines and wrecking their communication networks (Khan, 2015). The first strategy that most administrations have used to combat violent radicalism is "strategic communication." Through numerous discussions, lectures, community participation, and training by religious academics, strategic communication campaigns were targeted at altering people's minds. Due to governmental goals, such projects had a poor success rate. Strategic communication is a time-consuming method that needs durability as well as continuous financing. An alternative approach of strengthening trustworthy speakers at the grassroots level and spreading them to susceptible groups appears to be more effective than the previous model (Siddiq, 2017). This method is important in all countries facing terrorism as well, but it is a sluggish force that will not result in any real change. Despite violent extremism has long history, it resurfaced after numerous militants and Jihadist organizations began advocating their extreme ideologies following the United States' declaration of a worldwide war on terrorism in 2001. It consists of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Salafi Jihadi Movement, Al-Shabaab, Jabhat-Al-Nusra, and the Taliban, all of which have the primary goal of recruiting young and attaining their politico-religious aims (Gielen, 2019).

On January 16, 2018, the Pakistani government succeeded in establishing a nationwide discourse on counter-terrorism and radicalism dubbed "Paigham-e-Pakistan" after tremendous work over the previous fifteen years. Paigham-e-Pakistan condemns all forms of extremism, violence, and extremism and emphasizes the concept of peace and understanding among Muslims in the context of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The declaration is an important move in supplying the nation with a refute (Naseer et al, 2019). The Pakistani military launched the 'Mashal deradicalization initiative in 2009 to reintegrate detained terrorists from the Swat conflict. The

"Mashal" de-radicalization facility was constructed in the same structure that militants formerly exploited as their base. The de-radicalization program arose from the awareness that lasting peace couldn't have been maintained just via the use of guns and that there was a requirement to de-radicalize adolescents to prevent the potential terrorism threat (Naseer et al., 2019). The Pakistan Army began de-radicalizing militants by engaging psychiatrists, neutral clerics, and instructors. Over three thousand terrorists have been effectively de-radicalized, with a release rate of over 99 percent (Naseer et al., 2019). Such a high release ratio demonstrated efficiency and skill in the difficult work of CVE. A de-radicalization program including inmates' families, also aids in pulling them out of such morass. Relatives of convicts are also educated to supervise captives after they are released from the institution as part of the "Mashal" program. The reasoning is simple: if freed, the transformed adolescent is likely to resume the organization of terrorists. It becomes easier to reclaim for more rigorous de-radicalization through familial surveillance. Rehabilitation gives them a second opportunity to lead a fresh start. Instructors at the de-radicalization center also give technical education to inmates so that even when they are released from the institution, they may make a living by pursuing a vocation and not rely on others financially (Khan, 2015). Many other states are taking similar steps to keep track of and monitor freed inmates via authorities or relatives of the convicts (Rao et al., 2018). The ones who were once used as pawns by the terrorists are being trained to lead a better life.

II. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL TO RADICALIZE/DE-RADICALIZE

Religious conversation is also employed as a counter-radical strategy in Pakistan by preachers. The employment of Muslim scholars, who have higher credibility and esteem among militants, has been a wise tactic for de-radicalization (Abuza, 2008). In Malaysia, Youth utilizes social media so broadly that it had a lot of impact in de-radicalization through a cartoon called "Ketika Nurani Bicara (When Conscience Talks)," which began released in 2010 (Abubakar, 2016). The phrases that backed the comics were:

- i. Islam is the religion of peace
- ii. Islam is a peace-loving religion
- iii. The Prophet (PBUH) did call for Islam, but not by violence (Naseer et al., 2019).

Because of the widespread adoption of social media by ordinary people in current years, such a tactic bears a strong resemblance to Pakistan. Terrorist groups, on the other hand, utilize social media to radicalize, recruit, and collect finances through digital lectures and pleas. It has significantly increased the risk of radicalization among youngsters through internet means. The internet is used by more than 4 million people in Pakistan, with the young accounting for 70% of those who use it. Without a moderating system, such large popularity of social media may be more prone to extreme ideology (Basit, 2015). As part of Pakistan's CVE activities, the government must develop a framework to closely monitor the internet. Along with specific laws and discussions in parliament, the Pakistani are currently in the process of monitoring social media and analyzing web pages. Social media efforts against terrorist organizations also represent the nation's togetherness in the face of their heinous philosophy (Naseer et al., 2019). The most prevalent cause of violent extremists is social marginalization, political persecution, division, and badly managed places, where individuals experience an existential crisis, pervasive corruption, and violations of their basic rights. As a result, underdeveloped countries face severe bloodshed and violent extremism (White, 2021; Haider and Ali, 2015; Kaseem et al., 2019; Roussel et al., 2021; Senturk and Ali, 2021). The United States and European countries are shifting their focus to a "surrogate strategy" for combatting such misinformation. However, there is an imbalance between grass-roots, community-based activities and police enforcement (Heydemann, 2014). The CVE program's main purpose is to accomplish the following strategic goals:

1. Increasing resilience in order to repel extremism.
2. Creating counter-narratives as well as strategic outreach (Barzegar, 2016)

There are currently six major deradicalization programs running in the country: the Sabaoon Center for Rehabilitation, Mishal, Sparley, Rastoon, Pythom, and Heila. The first three focus on the education and rehabilitation of the radicalized individuals, correcting their religious beliefs and providing them and their families with counseling as needed (Qazi, 2013). First, the radicalized individuals are grouped according to the age and severity of radicalization. Then, they are provided with appropriate training which may last anywhere from half to one year. These three programs began in 2009 and have reported a 99% success rate in the deradicalization of more than 2500 radicalized extremists (Rana, 2011). Although without an independent evaluation, the accuracy of such results cannot be confirmed. Much smaller deradicalization also has begun throughout the nation who counter extremist ideas through inter-faith dialogues and providing Islamic

teachings through Madrassas to combat the false notion regarding the religion. Project Mishal in Swat focuses primarily on the radicalized adults while Project Sparely also checks on the families of the convicts. Some help is also provided by the government in finding jobs for the rehabilitation of these individuals. The greater goal is to reintegrate the radicalized extremists back into society as functioning parts of their environment (Schram, 2014). Deradicalization programs and approaches vary greatly across countries. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2002 Bali attacks, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Indonesia launched “first generation” deradicalization programs, which consisted of both prison-based education and post-incarceration monitoring and aftercare. Theological re-education and vocational training were core elements of these programs (Landau, 2019). De-radicalization programming has evolved toward more individualized approaches that incorporate local, social, and cultural dynamics. Many of the newer programs, particularly in Western democracies, also focus on broader community engagement and resilience and are beginning to develop early interventions to counter radicalization before it becomes violent (Daniel, 2017).

III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM/HYPOTHESIS

This part sets out to examine the contexts, methods, and conditions under which each of these types of programs (deradicalization, counter-radicalization, and anti-radicalization programs) are applied, examining both the methods and the strategies, presenting to the aim of deradicalization also organizational charges to continue deradicalization programmes in Pakistan. However, the chapter's overall focus is on methods and strategies of deradicalization programs aimed at individuals and collective levels.

IV. OBJECTIVES AND AIMS OF RESEARCH

The following objectives and aims were set to complete this research work:

- 1- The nature and extent of deradicalization programs used in, Pakistan and the need to apply methodological investigation to solve the threats/ problems/ issues on a macro and regional level by using multi-disciplinary and collaborative strategies to readdress plans and methods of deradicalization.
- 2- The comprehensive and objective assessments of the deradicalization process by using the different approaches and techniques.
- 3- To recommend different methods and strategies in combating methods and approaches in the deradicalization process.

V. CONCLUSION

The radicalization efforts in Pakistan are growing. Even though our relationship with Afghanistan has improved and overall, the number of happenings in the country has been on a decline since 2018, efforts have been seen by the TTP to come back into action. Even though their organization was dealt with, their core ideology and hatred were not addressed. Counter radicalization efforts in Pakistan have remained poorly funded (Tan, 2018). With the financial crises in Pakistan growing, ISK took this chance for recruitment from the communities most affected by these crises, e.g., the Brahui in Balochistan. The group is of great concern not only to Pakistan but to the entirety of South Asia, one that is being underestimated at the moment. ISK divided into two groups, namely the IS-Pakistan and IS-Hind which revealed their goals (Winter & Feixas 2019). The efforts made by Islamabad to counter these radicalized individuals have been unsuccessful with this, the Kashmiri militants, who are currently laying low can also come forth with another freedom movement against India, whether organized by the government or not, can worsen the situation between the two nations. The resurgence of new sects in Pakistan also obscures the internal security issue (Iqbal & Mehmood, 2021). With the advent of the Pandemic, the deradicalization situation of Pakistan only became worse. Even though major terrorist attacks and assassination of political leaders are no longer much probable of a threat, religious violence and violence against minorities is still a large issue. One of the biggest problems is that the judiciary and the police system in Pakistan are not strong enough to deal with terrorism. Even with the new Prime Minister, Imran Khan promising a change, the Police reforms have still stayed the same. Afzal Shigri, a former police Inspector General states the situation to have a “horrendous impact on the future governance and politics of Pakistan.” (Naseer et al., 2019). The severity of terrorism and its threat to the public will only worsen with time if left alone. Any type instability of has direct impact on socioeconomic development of a nation (Ali, 2015; Ali, 2018; Ali and Bibi, 2017; Ali and Ahmad, 2014; Ali and Audi, 2016; Ali and Audi, 2018; Ali and Rehman, 2015; Ali and Senturk, 2019). Many Pakistani officials dismiss these warnings as attempts by the opposition to try and hinder the progression of the CPEC. Even though regional enmities and violence are common, little is being done by the government to combat extremism and radicalization. One good step taken by the

government was towards intelligence coordination, where the masses and many military agencies were grouped as one (Bacon 2021). The rising extremism necessitates a government reaction by bolstering domestic security founded on the joint agreement of all parties. It is important to note that the biggest impediment to addressing this situation is weak governance. Furthermore, it is necessary to realize that cultural issues will prove to be a significant impediment to Pakistan's financial growth. Domestically, the government should use the "engage and get engaged" technique to bring all stakeholders together, as racial, sectarian, or non-secular divides constitute challenges to internal cohesion. Nonetheless, it is past time to take decisive steps to implement political, financial, and academic changes to address the looming issues of political turmoil, economic deterioration, and academic slip. Although counter-radicalization has been successful, a soft approach (CVE) is the better method for long-term success. Other nations utilize many effective techniques to conduct successful CVE; Pakistan could also use such gentle approaches. The responsibility for falsifying terrorist perspectives (which defame Islam) and broadening a counter-narrative (Paigham-e-Pakistan) falls on political-religious groups and civilized society. Terrorism will thrive despite counter-terrorism activities if such ideologies are not questioned or denounced.

VI. METHODS OF DE-RADICALIZATIONS

For the Government and deradicalization programs of Pakistan Investigate and identify effective methods and strategies that contribute to deradicalization. There are currently few demanding evaluations of radicalization and deradicalization. Islamabad must fund research into the fundamental causes and agents of this phenomenon.

VI.I. CURRENT DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS SHOULD BE IMPROVED

This is so that they may be developed beyond reduced operatives and strive toward thorough disapproval of radicalism and extremism without being confined to replacing convicts' anti-Pakistan ideology. Steps should be taken in a way that fits the culture and norms of Pakistan and also succeeds in getting rid of radicalism as well as extremism (Khan, 2016).

VI.II. CREATE TACTICS FOR COUNTER-RADICALIZATION, ALIENATION, AND DERADICALIZATION

Owing to government and administrative support, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), was established in 2009 to deal with deradicalization programs. The NACTA should

- i. Develop a national counter-radicalization plan, including particular campaigns for locations with high levels of radicalism and militant activity, along with a national deradicalization program focused on convicted militants who constitute a threat to radicalize prisoners (Qazi, 2013)
- ii. Create effective disengagement programs.
- iii. Create reliable metrics to assess the impact and efficacy of the initiatives.

VI.III. INCREASE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE STATE AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs)

Collaboration with trustworthy and responsible non-profits organizations may assist to solve different deficiencies in the public area, but also help to establish local credibility and influence a larger audience.

VI.IV. FORGET ABOUT SHORT-TERM METHODS TO ISLAMIC EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT

Authorities in Pakistan (and the United States) should recognize that changing madaris is a time-consuming and sensitive process. The programs of the ICRD and PINA provide some crucial lessons for future strategies:

- i. Engaging madrassas rather than marginalizing them is more successful.
- ii. Trust on both sides (government and madrasa) is essential.
- iii. Madrasa officials should be engaged as collaborators, with their perspectives and concerns acknowledged all through the transformation.
- iv. Base reformation on constructive Islamic ideas rather than secular or contemporary conceptions (Dorsey, 2018)

VI.V. ENHANCE COLLABORATION WITH CSOS AS WELL AS NGOS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST RADICALIZATION

Collaboration is required at the organizational and governmental level, it will increase the credibility, to combat radicalization and violence making a strategic proposal for deradicalization. The US should expand relationships with Pakistani non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have a track record of success, openness, and responsibility. Research indicates that international assistance to NGOs is useful in preventing extremism if the nation's NGOs sector is substantial and strong. Including approximately 100,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) functioning in Pakistan and several trying to combat radicalization. Increasing American funding toward non - the profit sector might be an effective way of lowering radicalization (Ahmed, 2020).

VI.VI. GREATER INTERACTION AMONG INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (INGOS) AND PAKISTANI NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED

National NGOs, as illustrated in PINA's example, might have accessibility and credibility but lack of competence and resources needed to administer programs well. Improved collaboration between US-based INGOs and Pakistani NGOs can help bridge this gap and improve local capability. ICRD initiatives that are carried out in partnership with local collaborators provide an effective paradigm of such cooperation.

VI.VII. ENHANCED AFTERCARE SHOULD BE INCORPORATED

Most effective initiatives involve a follow-up or monitoring program for recipients. Respondents emphasized the importance of families' contributions to rehab since they offer a low-cost and reliable surveillance tool that can help them to prevent relapse (Zaidi, 2016).

VI.VIII. ENHANCE POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS' SCREENING

Enhanced screening of recipients, as well as proper supervision, has been suggested as a way to reduce relapse rates. It was also advised that consideration to assisting program organizers.

VI.IX. CREATE AND REFINE METHODS FOR ASSESSING SUCCESS

A common issue in terrorist deradicalization is assessing and evaluating program deficiencies. Comparing programs with parameters is challenging, and in all situations, understanding the causes for processes and outcomes is critical. Participants also advocated for methods to assess value for expenditure on a government level. A solid set of indicators for both should be created as soon as possible (Sherazi, 2014).

VI.X. ADAPT YOUR STRATEGY TO THE PERSON OR GROUP IN QUESTION

People labeled murderers are frequently handled differently in deradicalization programs. The strategy for deradicalization should keep the convict under consideration. As demonstrated in the Algerian and Egyptian studies, it would be beneficial to examine group leaders personally and capitalize on the attractiveness of individuals eager to advance a deradicalization program. Similarly, it is critical to customize prison strategy to the scenario at present an attempt to determine whether convicts should be segregated or permitted to interact with one another and authorities.

VI.XI. INVOLVE POPULATIONS IMPACTED BY RADICALISM IN THE DERADICALIZATION PROCESS

Programs will not be successful or credible until the population accepts that deradicalized persons are no more a menace. When you take away a radicalized person's sense of friendship and connection, you must substitute it; a group that supports deradicalization can help with this. Repentant terrorists, as one member pointed out, may spread like a virus inside organizations, sowing uncertainty about violent radicalism and proving the viability of deradicalization initiatives to those who are suspicious. Another interlocutor recommended asking previous violent criminals to explain what they have learned about letting go of their extreme lifestyles and viewpoints. Speakers also stressed the critical role that civil society may play as a mediator (Zafar, 2016).

VI.XII. USE REWARDS SPARINGLY

Many deradicalization initiatives profit from convincing people to abandon terrorism through money and other rewards (such as decreased prison sentences) that can assist stabilize recipients' lives. In other cases, rewards may fail to owe to a lack of purchasing power from cultures that see them as a means of "satisfying" criminals.

VII. POLICYMAKERS SHOULD TAKE NOTE

VII.I. DERADICALIZATION SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A SOLUTION

Deradicalization efforts are not a solution. Indeed, several participants viewed deradicalization as merely one component of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy; deradicalization will have met with little success if used alone.

VII.II. TAKE NOTE OF THE CONTEXT

- i. What is suitable in one setting may not be correct in another setting. The timeline could also be a substantial aspect: deradicalization efforts that paused specific communities five years ago may be implemented in the very same regions today. Deradicalization initiatives must be adapted according to the areas where implementation is demanded.
- ii. Criminal judgment: Examine sentencing laws and be aware of gender narratives' effect on terrorism trials.
- iii. Structural changes: Recognize the issues that push males and females to engage in extremist organizations and try to create policies and initiatives to close these gaps.
- iv. Security field: Include females in operational positions in CVE, antiterrorism, and security sector activities to guarantee that reverted radicalized women are taken seriously as a potential security concern (Nikolaj,2017).

VII.III. FOR TRAINED PROFESSIONALS

Trained professionals should focus on

- i. Genuine voices: Identify trustworthy community players who can assist departing members in reintegrating because of the regard and position they have in their communities.
- ii. Youth: Ensure that youths, especially young women, are involved in program formulation and construction, rather than simply being targets of the program.
- iii. Factors: Men and women commonly join extremist groups to fill financial, sociological, or political voids. Offer credible solutions for resolving those issues.

VII.IV. FOR ACADEMICS

- i. Data collection: Close substantial shortcomings in regional-level extremist data along with gender-disaggregated information throughout the spectrum.
- ii. Contextual issues to consider: In order to provide a more comprehensive foundation, continue to investigate the situations that led to women's involvement in radical organizations, and the actual duties they had within those organizations.
- iii. Research partnership: Break down barriers across disciplines to allow successful comprehensive studies on diverse varieties of radicalism.

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